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Abstract. Regulation is commonly viewed as a hindrance to entrepreneurship, but heterogeneity 
in the effects of regulation is rarely explored. We focus on regional variation in the effects of 
national-level regulations by developing a theory of hierarchical institutional interdependence. 
Using the political science theory of market-preserving federalism, we argue that regional 
economic freedom attenuates the negative influence of national regulation on net job creation. 
Using U.S. data, we find that regulation destroys jobs on net, but regional economic freedom 
moderates this effect. In regions with average economic freedom, a one percent increase in 
regulation results in 14 fewer jobs created on net. However, a standard deviation increase in 
economic freedom attenuates this relationship by four fewer jobs. Interestingly, this moderation 
accrues strictly to older firms; regulation usually harms young firm job creation, and economic 
freedom does not attenuate this relationship.  
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1. Introduction 
Scholars in the tradition of New Institutional Economics (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; 
North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) have shown increasing interest in the influence of formal rules 
and informal social rules on entrepreneurship (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2017). The consistent insight emerging 
from this view is that entrepreneurial activity tends to yield productive outcomes when the 
institutional framework is favorable (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2016; Bradley & Klein, 2016). When 
institutions incentivize productive courses of entrepreneurial action at the micro level (Baumol, 
1990; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991; Sobel, 2008), employment and job creation result at the 
macro-level (Baumol & Strom, 2007; Bjørnskov & Foss, 2013; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1993). On the other hand, prohibitive institutions tend to reduce the economic benefits of 
entrepreneurship. Regulation, for instance, is a key barrier to venture creation and growth. 
Researchers have argued that regulation reduces industry employment growth (Bailey & Thomas, 
2017; Bertrand & Kramarz, 2002), creates barriers to new firm entry (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002), hinders investment (Escribá-Pérez & Murgui-García, 2017), and 
asymmetrically burdens small firms (Bradford, 2004; Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006).  
Despite its consistency, the entrepreneurship literature on regulation tends to present a 
simplistic view in that it fails to account for heterogeneous effects of regulatory institutions (Kim, 
Wennberg, & Croidieu, 2016). Many new ventures do emerge and grow in highly regulated 
industries, and the young, high-growth firms that drive job creation exist in all types of industries 
under widely varying regulatory regimes (Henrekson & Johansson, 2010). Furthermore, regional 
variation in entrepreneurial activity within a national institutional framework suggests the 
possibility of further heterogeneity of the effects of those national institutions (Fritsch & Storey, 
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2014). Why might national institutions like regulation be more constraining for entrepreneurial job 
creation in some regions than in others?  
 To answer this question, we develop a theory of hierarchical institutional interdependence: 
the effects of national institutional rules are contingent on the regional institutional framework. 
Specifically, we argue that regional economic freedom moderates the negative impact of national 
regulation for a key entrepreneurial outcome for economic growth: net job creation1. Recognizing 
not only the existence of but also the relationship among multiple, hierarchically situated 
governing units is a critical advance in our understanding of the institutions-entrepreneurship 
relationship. By explicitly modeling and measuring formal institutions at both the national and 
regional levels, we can more accurately depict the institutional environment, and we can assess 
both the direct and indirect consequences of institutions on economic growth. 
 We examine why the effects of national regulation on entrepreneurship vary across regions. 
One underexplored possibility is that regional policies—especially those that encourage the 
creation of private enterprises— might moderate the effects of national regulation. We hypothesize 
that regional economic freedom offsets the costs of national regulation on job creation. Our theory 
integrates insights from New Institutional Economics (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 1990; 
Williamson, 2000) and public choice theories of regulation (Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 
1971) with the political science theory of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995). Market 
preserving federalism suggests that regional policymakers possess more “local knowledge” about 
their particular economic context, and so they are able to oppose and counteract federal rules that 
do not accord with regional enterprise needs. We build on this to theorize that regional economic 
                                                 
1 Net job creation = job gains – job losses. We say that net jobs are created if job gains > job losses, but net jobs are 
destroyed if job gains < job losses. This is important because the economy grows with higher net job creation. This is 
explained in more detail in section 3.  
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freedom can be a mechanism for countervailing the effects of extant national regulation on 
entrepreneurial activity.  
Our key outcome is net job creation in an industry. This measure speaks to the key 
economic benefits of entrepreneurial activity, as it the emergent outcome of Schumpeterian 
innovation and competitive processes and is largely driven by entrepreneurial ventures (Birch, 
1987; Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2014). One additional advantage of this measure 
is that we can examine the effects of regulation on entrepreneurs relative to incumbents, by 
comparing results across the firm age spectrum. Although young firms are simultaneously 
burdened by regulation (Stigler, 1971) and enabled by a favorable regional context (Audretsch, 
Falck, Feldman, & Heblich, 2012), few studies directly compare the effects of institutions on new 
versus incumbent firm activity. We address this in our analysis, hypothesizing that local and 
regional policies that offset national regulation will have a greater effect on young firms rather 
than incumbents. Lastly, we address the call to more closely examine the heterogeneity in the 
effect of national-level regulation on entrepreneurship at the local level (Audretsch, Belitski, & 
Desai, 2018). By analyzing how the effects of regulation vary across regions and between different 
aged-firms, our study suggests the relationship between regulation and entrepreneurship is more 
nuanced than previously considered (Dilli, Elert, & Herrmann, 2018).   
We test our hypotheses with a three-way fixed effects model, which allows us to control 
flexibly for unobserved industry, county, and year-specific effects in addition to relevant regional 
covariates. Our results are consistent with our core hypotheses: regulation is associated with less 
job creation, economic freedom is associated with more job creation, and economic freedom 
attenuates the negative regulation-job creation relationship. Specifically, we find a one percent 
increase in industry-level regulation is associated with 14 fewer net jobs created in a county on 
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average, but this effect varies with the quality of the regional institutional environment. In states 
that have very little economic freedom, a one percent increase in industry-level regulation is 
associated with roughly 27 fewer net jobs created in a county. On the other hand, regulation has 
no discernable effect on net job creation in states that have very high levels of economic freedom. 
Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, the moderating effect appears strongest for older 
firms; in fact, we find no evidence of moderation for the youngest firms. We also decompose the 
economic freedom into its three sub-indices: fiscal freedom (government spending), tax freedom, 
and labor market freedom. We find that moderating effect holds for the tax and labor sub-indices 
but not for the fiscal freedom sub-index.  
These results are important for several reasons. First, we account for the multilevel, 
embedded nature of institutions to develop a more nuanced understanding of their implications for 
job creation. This approach follows recent multilevel work that has done much to clarify how the 
institutional context informs entrepreneurship—for instance, by shaping the motivations, 
aspirations, and decision making of entrepreneurs (Autio & Acs, 2010; Boudreaux, Nikolaev, & 
Klein, 2018; Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013). Studies at the regional-level or individual-
level often neglect the country-level context (Charron, Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2014; Spigel, 2016, 
2017), whereas studies at the country-level (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 
2008; Nyström, 2008) often lose nuance through aggregation. By contrast, the multilevel approach 
provides additional nuance that is often overlooked by researchers (Audretsch et al., 2018). And 
while scholars have paid much attention to national and regional enterprise policy separately, ours 
is one of the first studies to directly investigate the interaction among policies across institutional 
levels (Schröder & Voelzkow, 2016). 
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Second, we contribute to the literature on institutions and entrepreneurship by focusing on 
the disparate impacts of regulation for firm growth across the firm age spectrum. Recent work 
suggests that institutions influence entrepreneurial growth aspirations (Estrin et al., 2013), but we 
know less about the effects of regulation on actual growth outcomes, such as employment growth. 
Furthermore, while it is understood that new entrants differ from incumbents in  growth decisions 
(Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006), the differential effects of institutions on growth 
outcomes across the firm age spectrum have yet to be explored. 
Third, our evidence affirms regional economic freedom, in addition to national, as an 
important object for entrepreneurship research (McMullen et al., 2008). We extend the insight that 
economic freedom is beneficial for job creation to the regional context; however, we also find an 
underexplored benefit of regional economic freedom: its ability to offset the cost of national policy. 
This suggests that regional policymakers have the potential to cultivate a promising institutional 
framework through at least two dimensions of economic freedom, including favorable tax regimes 
and flexible labor market policies. Fourth, and finally, we offer the surprising finding that the costs 
of regulation and the offsetting benefits of regional economic freedom appear to be primarily 
concentrated among older firms—at least in terms of employment growth. We offer some possible 
explanations for this finding.  
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
With the rise of New Institutional Economics as a predominant perspective on economic 
development, scholars have increasingly recognized that human action does not occur in an 
institutional vacuum (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). The notion that the political “rules of the 
game” impact economic activity is now widely accepted; institutions shape the relative rewards, 
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risk attitudes, and expectations about future outcomes (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017; Williamson, 
2000). However, the relationship between institutions and job creation specifically has received 
less attention—particularly from a regional perspective. Furthermore, studies that focus on the 
institutional determinants of job creation tend to treat policy as a single-level phenomenon, e.g., 
by considering only national regulation (Bailey & Thomas, 2017; Bertrand & Kramarz, 2002) or 
national economic freedom (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008) without attending to spatial heterogeneity 
arising from regional enterprise policy.2 Thus, before delving into the interaction of multilevel 
governance institutions, we develop baseline hypotheses on the direct effects of national regulation 
and regional economic freedom. 
 
2.1. Regulation 
Regulation is expected to deter job creation for a number of reasons. The first relates to the 
nature of regulation as outlined in the economic theory of regulation (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971). This view posits that interest groups influence the outcome of the regulatory process by 
providing support to politicians or regulators. Actors involved in the regulatory process are 
assumed to be rational and self-interested—the same as everyone else (Buchanan, 1984). 
Furthermore, politicians are able to extract personal benefits via the regulatory process in the form 
of political support and campaign contributions (Holcombe, 2002, 2013), and regulators are able 
                                                 
2 Williamson (2000) provides a framework that categorizes institutions into a four-level hierarchy. This theoretical 
framework has been applied entrepreneurship to better understand institutional context (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017; 
Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008; Pacheco, York, Dean, & Sarasvathy, 
2010). Informal institutions (level one) are deeply embedded in society and include customs, traditions, and religious 
norms; they emerge spontaneously and change over a long period of time (100 to 1000 years). Formal institutions 
(level two of the hierarchy) relate to the efficacy of government action including property rights protection and the 
quality of the regulatory environment; they can change more rapidly (ten to 100 years). Governance (level three) 
represents the play of the game, which can change even more rapidly (one to ten years). Lastly, the fourth level is that 
of resource allocation, employment choices, and entrepreneurship (Williamson, 2000). Our dependent variables deal 
with hierarchically-structured formal institutions within level two of Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy. 
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to extract personal benefits like appointments to lucrative and powerful positions in the regulated 
sector (Holcombe & Boudreaux, 2015). When regulation is the outcome of self-interested 
exchange, it is said to yield concentrated benefits to organized interests while yielding dispersed 
costs to others—e.g., to firms now facing additional compliance costs. 
In addition to compliance costs, an extension of the economic theory of regulation to the 
‘revolving door hypothesis’ (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012; Gormley Jr, 1979) 
suggests that complex and extensive regulation is a byproduct of this regulatory phenomenon. 
When regulations are complex, firms need experts to help navigate through the red tape. Who 
better to hire than the ones who wrote the regulation? As (Schweizer, 2013, p. 17) argues, “There 
is money to be made in creating complex rules and laws that nobody can understand. Those who 
write these laws and regulations can leave their posts and charge companies large fees to decipher 
the very regulations they wrote.” Regulatory complexity further raises the cost of hiring and 
retaining employees. Regulators and ex-employees of regulatory agencies can help firms navigate 
this onerous process, but they can also use the political process to encourage rent seeking (Krueger, 
1974; Murphy et al., 1993; Tullock, 1967) and to create entry barriers (Dean & Brown, 1995; 
Djankov et al., 2002).  
 Rent seeking is additionally costly for economic growth (Murphy et al., 1993) because it 
encourages unproductive entrepreneurship at the expense of productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 
1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Sobel, 2008). Rent seeking entails a reallocation of efforts by 
incumbents from market to political competition, which is especially destructive when it results in 
entry barriers. For instance, rent seeking strategies may result in occupational licensing (Kleiner, 
2000; Meehan & Benson, 2015) or may force new entrants to adopt more stringent regulations via 
“grandfather clauses” (Dean & Brown, 1995). Consistent with this logic, regulations that raise the 
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costs of entry have been shown to hinder job creation among new firms (Bertrand & Kramarz, 
2002; Branstetter, Lima, Taylor, & Venâncio, 2014) Firms can use rent seeking to persistently 
distort efficient resource allocation (Caves & Porter, 1977), often through a coalition of special 
interests (Olson, 1965).  
 Politically-connected firms are able to use their political capital to profit from regulatory 
activity (Fisman, 2001). Firms with strong political connections often curry special favors from 
regulatory agencies and face lower hurdles than firms with weaker political connections (Berkman, 
Cole, & Fu, 2010). For instance, entrepreneurship in China is governed more by political capital 
and less by market fundamentals (Ge, Stanley, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2017). If rent seeking 
encourages unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship, less connected firms will have to 
devote more resources to dealing with the political process and satisfying regulatory requirements.  
In sum, ample empirical evidence suggests that regulatory restrictions impose additional 
compliance costs, causing firms to reallocate scarce resources away from productive growth. 
Consequently, we should observe less economic activity—such as net job creation—with 
increasing regulation. For these reasons, we propose our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Regulation is associated with less net job creation (or more net job destruction).  
 
2.2. Regional economic freedom 
Economic freedom, defined broadly as the extent to which political institutions facilitate 
personal choice, voluntary exchange, and market competition, has been shown to nurture 
entrepreneurship (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008, 2016; Boudreaux, 2014; Boudreaux, Nikolaev, & 
Klein, 2017; McMullen et al., 2008; Nikolaev et al., 2018; Nyström, 2008) and economic 
development (Carlsson & Lundström, 2002; de Haan & Sturm, 2000; Gwartney, Lawson, & 
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Holcombe, 1999). High economic freedom is said to be integral to a pro-market institutional 
environment, encouraging productive entrepreneurship; in contrast, institutional environments 
characterized by low economic freedom tend to encourage unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Boudreaux, Nikolaev, & Holcombe, 2018; Sobel, 2008). As 
Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) explain, pro-market institutions involve lower risks of government 
expropriation and better enforcement of contracts. When institutions are weak, the risk of arbitrary 
expropriation reduces the benefits of entrepreneurial action, encourages opportunistic behavior, 
and reduces the expected return from new ventures (Estrin et al., 2013). Pro-market institutions 
help to minimize the risks associated with uncertainty, enabling entrepreneurial action (McMullen 
& Shepherd, 2006). 
It is thus well-established that national economic freedom facilitates voluntary exchange, 
thereby increasing economic dynamism and development through a variety of outcomes (Hall & 
Lawson, 2014). This has the effect of increasing demand, facilitating firm growth aspirations 
(Estrin et al., 2013), and incentivizing in-migration (Ashby, 2010). Taken together, these factors 
naturally suggest a positive relationship between economic freedom and job creation. 
Yet, regional economic freedom has received less attention in relation to such benefits 
(Hall, 2013). While the composition fallacy suggests caution in extrapolating to different levels of 
analysis (Caballero, 1991), there are strong reasons to expect regional economic freedom to also 
be positively related to net job creation. The relationship between economic freedom and in-
migration appears to hold at the regional level (Ashby, 2007; Mulholland & Hernández-Julián, 
2013); so do the benefits of regional economic freedom for development (Ashby, Bueno, & 
Martinez, 2013), entrepreneurship (Kreft & Sobel, 2005), well-being (Belasen & Hafer, 2013), 
and wages (Ashby et al., 2013). Economic freedom is thus a crucial feature of the regional 
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institutional environment and an important antecedent of job creation, leading us to hypothesize 
the following:  
Hypothesis 2: Regional economic freedom is associated with more job creation (or less job 
destruction). 
 
2.3. Market preserving federalism 
 So far, our discussion has been broadly consistent with the standard framework of New 
Institutional Economics: macro-level institutions shape the incentives and opportunities of micro-
level actors (Boudreaux & Nikolaev, 2018). While valuable, this framework runs the risk of 
oversimplification, because it tends only to incorporate two levels at a time (cf. Williamson, 2000). 
Recently, institutional accounts have been enriched by going beyond a two-level, macro-to-micro 
framework. Once the relevance of multiple institutional levels, rather than a single plane of 
institutions, is considered, the interactions among institutions become notable. For instance, meso-
level structures may affect the causal linkages among political rules and individual actors (Kim et 
al., 2016). This logic has led to the insight that informal institutions like social trust or networks 
may offset the effects of legal institutions (Estrin et al., 2013; Kim & Li, 2014). In general, when 
multiple institutional levels have been treated concurrently, formal institutions have been 
conceptualized as a single level (Williamson, 2000). We enrich this story by looking within the 
formal institutional “level”—which is in fact comprised of multiple, hierarchical levels of 
government entities. 
 While research indicates a connection between regulation and reduced economic activity 
(Klapper et al., 2006), it is likely that this relationship is context dependent. In other words, we 
expect that other features of the institutional environment moderate the strength of this 
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relationship. In theorizing about the interaction of formal governance institutions, we draw on 
insights from Constitutional Political Economy3 and the theory of market-preserving federalism 
(Weingast, 1995) to identify the costs and benefits associated with a variety of forms of 
governance. 
 The theory of market-preserving federalism seeks to address a core political dilemma: how 
can government simultaneously be strong enough to protect individual rights and also be trusted 
not to use that strength to itself infringe on those rights? The question speaks to the tradeoff 
between the capacity to protect and the potential to oppress. If government is capable of preserving 
the wealth of its citizens, it is likely also capable of confiscating that wealth. Since the risk of 
confiscation can deter entrepreneurial activity (North, 1990), economic performance depends on 
the emergence of institutional arrangements where government protects and enforces property 
rights—facilitating the creation of wealth by individuals—but is also limited in the tendency to 
appropriate the wealth created by those individuals (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). 
 The federalist governance structure has long been heralded as a relatively successful 
mechanism for navigating this tightrope of political power (Hayek, 1960). Federalism is a form of 
decentralized governance characterized by hierarchical, autonomous governing entities, each with 
a clearly delineated scope of authority (Riker, 1964). According to Weingast (1995), market-
preserving federalism exists when the regional government in a federal governance structure 
features three characteristics. First, regional governments, rather than national, must be the 
principal source of economic activity governance. Second, regional governments must not be able 
to substantively restrict trade with other regional units; there must be a “common market” at the 
                                                 
3 Constitutional Political Economy focuses on the functioning and implications of alternative political institutional 
arrangements (Brennan & Buchanan, 2008). The term “constitutional” refers to a focus on the design and selection of 
constraints (Buchanan, 1990). For more information on this topic, we refer the reader to the seminal work of Buchanan 
& Tullock (1962) and to Persson & Tabellini (2005) for empirical examples.  
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national level. Third, the regional government must face a “hard budget constraint,” meaning that 
it cannot borrow indefinitely or print money (Weingast, 1995, p. 4). When these criteria are met, 
the state is said to “credibly commit” to the preservation of market incentives: entrepreneurs can 
have a reasonable expectation that the government will enable their market activity without 
extensive confiscation (Qian & Weingast, 1997). 
 The theory of market-preserving federalism emphasizes the benefits of this structure for 
economic development in comparison to other national economic systems. Indeed, nations that 
embrace the features of market-preserving federalism tend to enjoy economic development relative 
to those that do not (Weingast, 1995).4  
 
2.4. The moderating role of economic freedom 
 The theory of market-preserving federalism informs our hypothesis about the interplay of 
national and regional government for regional economic activity. The logic suggests that a core 
benefit of regional enterprise policy is the ability to counteract the costs of national policy in the 
regional economy. Regional government thus plays the critical role of limiting the imposition of 
rules by the national government when those rules are inconsistent with regional economic needs. 
This follows from the idea that regional government is “closer” to the local citizenry and thereby 
has better access to knowledge about the regional economic system (Hayek, 1960). It is unlikely 
that a single set of institutional rules will be “optimal” for every regional economy (Dilli et al., 
2018)—especially in light of the economic theory of regulation outlined above. This suggests that 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that the de facto governance structure can be federalist and market-preserving regardless of 
the de jure, formally designated institutions (Williamson, 1994). For instance, the late 20th century trend of marked 
economic development in China is said to have been facilitated by the government’s adoption of a functional structure 
according with the features of market-preserving federalism (Qian & Weingast, 1996). Similarly, the Industrial 
Revolution-era United Kingdom and the 19th and 20th century United States experienced significant economic progress 
under market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995). 
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federal regulation need not accord with economic development in the heterogeneous regions 
affected by it. By contrast, regional policymakers are taking increasing responsibility for economic 
performance, as evidenced by widespread interest in the creation of industrial districts 
(Digiovanna, 1996; Tomlinson & Branston, 2017). With this in mind, regional policymakers may 
seek to offset the influence of federal regulation through their own policy decisions. 
  Economic freedom is a vehicle by which regional enterprise policy can be crafted to 
facilitate entrepreneurship and innovation. In addition to the direct benefits already explicated, an 
important, indirect benefit of regional economic freedom is the reduction of federal regulatory 
costs in the region. Whereas regulation imposes restrictions and thereby compliance costs, 
economic freedom facilitates experimentation and exchange. This is one way that regional 
institutions may be seemingly “incoherent” with national institutions but may yet be 
complementary (Schröder & Voelzkow, 2016). Case studies have illustrated how this kind of 
regional divergence from national regulation can facilitate economic activity for sectoral clusters 
with specific resource needs—e.g., a flexible and high-skilled workforce (Crouch & Voelzkow, 
2009). 
 The moderating effect of regional economic freedom on national regulation for job creation 
emerges from this logic. Whereas national regulation imposes compliance costs and thus raises the 
costs of job creation, high levels of economic freedom can attenuate these costs. To the extent that 
a comprehensive governance structure consistent with economic freedom facilitates exchange, 
consumer demand will be increased. Thus, the relative benefits of bringing on additional labor—
even that which requires additional regulatory training and compliance—are greater. Furthermore, 
regional institutions commonly conform to national institutional standards (Crouch, Gales, 
Trigilia, & Voelzkow, 2001). This means that national and regional policy are often 
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complementary in their effects, so higher levels of economic freedom can represent a departure 
from national institutional standards. High levels of economic freedom enable businesses to grow 
and reduce regulatory barriers. 
 On the other hand, where regional economic freedom is low, the federalist governance 
structure is less likely to attenuate the impact of national regulation. With a more limited set of 
opportunities resulting from low economic freedom, entrepreneurs will remain encumbered by 
national regulation, relatively un-tailored to the regional economic climate. Furthermore, 
reductions of economic freedom typically entail regulatory restrictions at the regional level, which 
may complement national regulatory rules (Macey, 1990). The overlapping and cumulative nature 
of policies across government levels may be significant (Revesz, 2001). Low levels of regional 
economic freedom often involve high business taxation, adding another cost to employment 
growth alongside regulatory constraints.  
 The above discussion leads us to expect that regional economic freedom serves as a market-
preserving mechanism relative to federal regulation: regions that are more economically free 
preserve regional economic activity by promoting labor market flexibility and insulating local 
enterprise from federal rulemaking. Altogether, this logic suggests that the costs of federal 
regulation for job creation are reduced where regional economic freedom is higher. This leads us 
to predict the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Economic freedom will moderate the relationship between regulation and job 
creation such that regulation is less harmful to job creation as economic freedom increases.  
 
 We also note that the various components of economic freedom often have heterogeneous 
effects (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008, 2016; Estrin et al., 2013; Heckelman & Stroup, 2005). For 
instance, the government spending component of economic freedom is weakly negatively 
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correlated with the rest of the index at the country level (Heckelman & Stroup, 2005). Moreover, 
an examination of the area components of economic freedom finds that a summary index can mask 
nuanced relationships if the components affect economic activity in different directions (Carlsson 
& Lundström, 2002). For these reasons, it behooves us to consider how each component of the 
economic freedom index (government spending, taxation, and labor market freedom) moderates 
the relationship between regulation and net job creation. We describe the components of economic 
freedom in the data section and examine each component in our results section.  
 
2.5. Moderation and the firm age spectrum 
Integrating the theory of market-preserving federalism with the economic theory of 
regulation is a natural fit, as both take an economic and institutional view of competing interests 
in the formation of policy. Together, the theories suggest that regional economic freedom offsets 
the harms of national regulation for job creation. However, recent studies have also emphasized 
firm age as an important factor for job creation (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). We thus extend our 
theory to account for differential effects across the firm age spectrum. 
We expect the moderating relationship to be most pronounced for young firms. To see this, 
consider that the economic theory of regulation regularly pits incumbents against entrants. Stigler’s 
seminal work suggests that the ‘industry,’ comprised of firms already organized into a 
concentrated interest, ‘demands’ regulation in order to deter competitors from entering (Stigler, 
1971). The implication is that regulation is most costly to potential and/or young firms—a 
prediction supported in the literature (Bertrand & Kramarz, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2014). 
Conversely, the institution of economic freedom is said to be a critical enabler of 
entrepreneurship (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2016; Boudreaux, 2014; Bradley & Klein, 2016; Kreft & 
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Sobel, 2005). Economic freedom allows for flexibility and experimentation, creating favorable 
conditions for new ventures to be birthed and to grow. Together, this suggests that the interaction 
among regulation and regional economic freedom should be most prominent among 
entrepreneurial firms. Because regulation is often coopted by special interests, it is said to be 
particularly harmful to entrepreneurs; thus, the benefits of the state-level economic freedom that 
would offset these harms should accrue largely to new ventures.5 
Nonetheless, we do expect the moderating relationship to hold for mature firms as well. 
Economic freedom can enable innovation and growth for all firms—not just new entrants. As our 
market-preserving federalism theory suggests, regional policy can safeguard for regional economic 
interests relative to national or extra-regional interest groups. Thus, there may also be disparate 
interests among industry participants across regions; mature firms will enjoy market-preserving 
benefits as well. Incumbents, however, are established and thus likely better able to organize to 
combat interregional political competition than are young firms—likely through regional policies 
not captured by economic freedom. By contrast, regional economic freedom tends to ‘level’ the 
intraregional playing field with respect to national regulation, mitigating cronyism and the need 
for firm experience with policymakers and thereby reducing the obstacles to competitive 
advantage for entrants. So while the market-preserving benefits of regional economic freedom are 
broadly applicable, our theory points to heterogeneity in the magnitude of these benefits with 
respect to firm age. Thus, we also hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Economic freedom will moderate the relationship between regulation and job 
creation to a greater extent for young entrepreneurial firms relative to mature, established firms.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
                                                 
5 While we do not ascribe to the view that equates new or young firm activity with entrepreneurship, we acknowledge 
these as a manifestation of entrepreneurship. 
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To operationalize our research questions, we construct an industry-county panel in the U.S. 
from 2003 to 2015 using several sources. For national regulation, we use RegData, a novel measure 
of regulatory stringency that quantifies the number of restrictive words (e.g., “shall,” “must”) in 
the text of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and uses a machine-learning algorithm to assign 
restrictions to industries.  
For regional policy, we utilize a comprehensive measure of the enterprise policy climate: 
state economic freedom, as measured by the Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of North 
America (EFNA) index. Whereas specific policy initiatives to foster entrepreneurship often fail 
(Acs, Astebro, Audretsch, & Robinson, 2016; Lerner, 2009), economic freedom—including small 
government, favorable tax policy, and flexible labor market policy—has a robust, positive 
relationship to entrepreneurial activity and employment growth across nations (McMullen et al., 
2008; Nikolaev, Boudreaux, & Palich, 2018; Nyström, 2008) and regions (Calcagno and Sobel 
2014; Gohmann et al. 2008; Sobel 2008).  
Because we are interested in the effect of regulation on high-growth entrepreneurship 
outcomes, we use the Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) to measure our 
outcome of net job creation (Birch, 1987; Davis, Haltiwanger, & Schuh, 1996; Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013). Job creation is a key feature of economic dynamism and is thus the 
object of much scholarly attention (Decker et al., 2014) and a focal point for regional enterprise 
policy. To that end, QWI is an ideal measure for our purpose, as it reports employment dynamics 
by firm age within each major industry at a local geographic level. Positive net job creation 
indicates the number of jobs created exceeds the number of jobs destroyed whereas negative net 
job creation indicates the reverse.  
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3.1. Dependent variable: Net job creation 
 We use employment data from the quality workforce indicators (QWI) to construct our job 
creation measure. QWI data is available at the county-level for each North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) industry, and we use the two-digit NAICS level of classification. 
QWI provides these data for each quarter and in several age bins including: 1) 0–1 years, 2) 2–3 
years, 3) 4–5 years, 4) 6–10 years, and 5) 11 or more years. To construct our job creation measure, 
we aggregate quarterly data to annual data for each industry-county observation, allowing 
comparison with our other variables. QWI provides several employment measures including end 
of year employment, job gains, and job losses. We combine the last two measures to create a net 
job gain (or loss) measure, which we denote as net job creation. Positive numbers for our measure 
indicate job creation (job gains > job losses); negative numbers indicate job destruction (job gains 
< job losses).  
 
3.2. Independent variables 
3.2.1. National Regulation 
 Our measure of regulation is gathered from RegData (McLaughlin & Sherouse, 2016). This 
dataset quantifies the number of regulatory restrictions in the Code of Federal Regulations, the 
federal administrative code in the U.S., from 1970 to 2017. RegData features an annual measure 
of industry regulation available at several industry levels (2- through 6-digit NAICS); we utilize 
the 2-digit NAICS in order to match with QWI data. This variable first measures the number of 
restrictive words—“shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” and “required”—in each subsection 
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(‘part’) of the Code of Federal Regulations. The dataset’s authors then employ machine learning 
to assign a probability that the restrictions in a subsection apply to a given industry. The product 
of the restrictive words times the probability is calculated for each industry and then summed 
across all subsections for a given year, yielding a measure of federal regulation (Al-Ubaydli & 
McLaughlin, 2017). The dataset also reports which agencies issue the regulatory restrictions. 
Additionally, the dataset includes the total number of words rather than the restrictions as an 
alternative industry regulation measure. We use this alternative measure of regulation to test the 
robustness of our results.  
 
3.2.2. Regional Economic Freedom 
 We use the economic freedom6 measure from the Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
North America (EFNA) index (Stansel, Torra, & McMahon, 2017). Economic freedom is 
comprised of nine variables in three areas7: (1) government spending, (2) taxes, and (3) labor 
market freedom. The first area, government spending, is measured as the extent of government 
consumption, transfers and subsidies, and insurance and retirement payments. The second area, 
taxes, is measured by income and payroll tax revenue, the top marginal income tax rate, the 
property tax rate, and sales tax revenues. The third area uses minimum wage legislation, 
government employment, and union density to measure labor market freedom. We use the 
subnational, state-level index, measured on a scale from zero (low economic freedom) to 10 (high 
economic freedom).  
                                                 
6 See Berggren (2003) and Hall and Lawson (2014) for excellent reviews of the literature on economic freedom.  
7 We use the subnational index, which is the preferred index for comparisons within a single country (Stansel, Torra, 
& McMahon, 2017). An alternative measure is the ‘all government’ index, which is comprised of additional 
variables and areas. Refer to the Economic Freedom of North America report for more detail. 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom-of-north-america-2017 
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3.3. Controls 
 We include several variables to control for relevant county-level differences. To control 
for the health of the local economy, we use county median household income, unemployment rate 
(%), and poverty rate (%). We expect that counties with a healthy local economy will have more 
job creation. We also include several demographic controls. We use population and population 
density to control for agglomeration economies (Duranton & Puga, 2004; Porter, 1996; Rosenthal 
& Strange, 2004) and to proxy urban context (Griffith, 1981; McDonald, 1989). Lastly, we also 
include the number of firms as a proxy for the competitive density of the local area (Voss & Voss, 
2008). A highly competitive market will likely lower profits, which might result in less firm growth 
and job creation. All controls are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
 Our sample consists of 463,474 total observations. The sample selection is comprised as 
follows: we begin by collecting all available net job creation data from the QWI. This sample 
represents 1,043,924 county-industry-year observations. We then match these data with the EFNA 
index and lose 104,359 observations due to missing data. Next we match this dataset with the 
RegData and lose 280,655 observations due to RegData’s omission of certain industries. Lastly, 
we match our dataset with the controls from the U.S. Census, which reduces our sample by 195,436 
observations for a total of 463,474 observations. However, the number of observations range from 
313,552 to 447,556 within the different firm-age categories due to data availability.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Table 1 summarizes these data. On average, there are over 48 jobs created annually in a 
county. The average level of economic freedom is 7, which ranges from a low of 5.25 to a high of 
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8.46. There is substantial variation in industry-level regulations. The average number of 
restrictions for an industry is 60,247, which ranges from a low of 4,558 to a high of 209,220. The 
average household has a median household income of $42,849. Lastly, the average county has 
89,347 residents or 175 persons per square mile (density), a poverty rate of 15.69 percent, an 
unemployment rate of 6.5 percent, and 209 firms. Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for these 
variables. Most variables are not highly correlated with other variables, which reduces concerns 
of multicollinearity. We now proceed to a discussion of our estimation methods.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
3.4. Estimation methods 
 To test our hypotheses, we model job creation as a function of several explanatory 
variables: 
       𝐽𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  ×  𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝛱𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1) 
The outcome variable, JC, denotes net job creation in county i industry j and year t. The right-hand 
side of the equation includes regulation (R), economic freedom (EF), their interaction, and a vector 
of controls (X) for each observation of county i, industry j in year t. The parameters, measured by 
β, capture the effect of each variable on job creation. In particular, β1 and β2 capture the direct 
effect of regulation and economic freedom whereas β3 captures the effect of their interaction. The 
parameter δ captures the effects of each variable in the vector of controls (X). The parameters λ, θ, 
and Π capture county, industry, and year heterogeneity. These fixed-effects are included to control 
for common macroeconomic trends and unobserved regional and industry idiosyncrasies 
(Bournakis, Papanastassiou, & Pitelis, 2018). The parameter, u, is the disturbance term, which is 
assumed independently and identically distributed (iid). However, we control for potential 
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heteroscedasticity by using robust standard errors clustered at the county-level. Except for state 
economic freedom (index), we express all explanatory variables in logs. This transforms all 
coefficient estimates into elasticities, easing the interpretation of our findings.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results: The moderating effect is supported 
 Table 3 illustrates the direct effects of national regulation and regional economic freedom 
on net job creation as well as the moderating effect of regional economic freedom on the 
regulation-job creation relationship. Here, we test and find support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
Model 1 presents our baseline results, which includes our control variables but does not include 
measures of regulation or economic freedom. Model 2 augments this model by including the 
measures of regulation and economic freedom. The results indicate that more regulation is 
associated with fewer net jobs created (β = –14.12; p < 0.001), while economic freedom is 
associated with more jobs created (β = 31.12; p < 0.001). Model 3 adds an interaction term to test 
our hypothesis that economic freedom moderates the effect of regulation. The likelihood ratio (LR) 
test that compares Models 2 and 3 indicates that the differences between the models are statistically 
significant, which suggests that the interaction model is appropriate. The results continue to 
support Hypotheses 1 and 2, while also providing support for Hypothesis 3. Specifically, Model 3 
indicates that regulation is associated with fewer net jobs created (β = –57.85; p < 0.001), but this 
effect decreases as economic freedom increases (β = 6.24; p < 0.001). For instance, in states with 
the average level of economic freedom, a one percent increase in regulation is associated with 14 
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jobs destroyed.8 However, for a one standard deviation increase in economic freedom, the negative 
effect of regulation on net job creation is attenuated by four jobs gained (four fewer jobs destroyed 
on net).9 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
 To better understand the moderating effect of regional economic freedom, we plot the 
marginal effects of regulation on net job creation at various levels of economic freedom along with 
95 percent confidence intervals in Figure 1. The vertical axis denotes the effect on the number of 
jobs created on net whereas the horizontal axis denotes the quality of economic freedom; note that 
we restrict the action and prediction to the range of our sample rather than the range of the index 
(zero to ten) to avoid extrapolation. The figure illustrates that regulation has a more adverse effect 
on net job creation when economic freedom is lower. At the bottom of the economic freedom 
distribution (EF = 5), a one percent increase in regulation is associated with 20 fewer net jobs 
created ceteris paribus. However, in regions where economic freedom exceeds the average level 
(EF > 7), a one percent increase in regulation is associated with virtually no decrease in net jobs 
created. In fact, the effect of regulation is not statistically and significantly different from zero 
based on the standard 95 percent confidence interval at above-average levels of economic freedom.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
4.2. Decomposing the EFNA index 
                                                 
8 We arrive at this number by taking the average level of economic freedom (7) and multiplying it by the moderating 
effect (6.236), which is 43.65. We then subtract this number from the estimate for the log of restrictions (-57.85) and 
arrive at the difference of -14.2.  
9 The standard deviation of economic freedom is 0.62 and the moderating effect of economic freedom is 6.236. 
Therefore, a one standard deviation increase yields 3.87 (0.62 x 6.236) fewer jobs destroyed on net. We round this to 
four jobs.  
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 Though we did not hypothesize about them individually, we also report results for each of 
the three EFNA sub-indices to investigate potential heterogeneity in the effects of different aspects 
of economic freedom. Models 4–6 of Table 3 present the decomposed results. Following standard 
practice (e.g., Wennberg, Pathak, & Autio, 2013), we replace the EFNA summary index with each 
of its three components (i.e., government spending, taxes, and labor market freedom) and include 
the interaction with each sub-index separately First, we note that regulation continues to be 
negative and statistically significantly harmful to net job creation, further supporting Hypothesis 
1. Consistent with our results for the summary measure of economic freedom, we observe that tax 
freedom (β = 28.79; p < 0.001) and labor market freedom (β = 32.17; p < 0.001) moderate the 
effect of regulation on net job creation. Furthermore, we find positive and significant coefficients 
for the direct effects of these two economic freedom components. In contrast, we find no evidence 
to suggest that the freedom from government spending component moderates the effect of 
regulation on net job creation. This further validates the findings in previous studies that identify 
heterogeneity in economic freedom (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2016). Interestingly, we find that the direct 
effect of freedom from government spending on net job creation is negative and significant in each 
of Models 4–6. 
4.3. Comparison of results by firm age 
We now examine the effect of regulation on net job creation for different age firms in order 
to test Hypothesis 4. Table 4 separates our data into different firm age categories, which include 
young firms (less than one year of age) and mature firms (greater than 10 years of age). We focus 
on these two categories as they are the most consistent with our theoretical constructs and 
consistent with prior literature using QWI data (Curtis & Decker, 2018)10. Models 1–4 of Table 4 
                                                 
10 We also estimated these models for the other age categories provided by the QWI dataset (2-3 years, 4-5 years, and 
6-10 years). We found no statistical relationship for the age categories 2-3, 4-5, and 6-10 years of age. Moreover, we 
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detail the results for young firms (0-1 years of age); Models 5–8 detail the results for mature firms 
(≥ 11 years of age). In the main models, we find that the economic freedom summary index is 
associated with more net jobs created for young firms (Model 1; β = 4.12; p < 0.001) and mature 
firms (Model 5; β = 25.64; p < 0.001), but regulation is only associated with fewer net jobs created 
for mature firms (Model 5; β = –48.68; p < 0.001). Regulation is negative but insignificantly related 
to net job creation for young firms in our main model (Model 1; β = –9.18, p > 0.05). We do find 
negative and significant effects for regulation in each of the sub-index regressions for both young 
firms (Models 2–4) and mature firms (Models 6–8). Interestingly, economic freedom only 
moderates the effect of regulation on net job creation for mature firms: in Model 5, the coefficient 
on the main index interaction term is statistically significant and positive (β = 5.63; p < 0.001). 
We find continued support for the moderating effect for the taxation (Model 7; β = 5.88; p < 0.001) 
and labor market freedom (Model 8; β = 6.64; p < 0.001) sub-indices; as in the main results, the 
government size sub-index interaction is insignificant (Model 5; β = 1.50; p > 0.05). The young 
firm moderating terms are all insignificant: the interaction is economically and statistically 
insignificant in Model 1 (β = –0.45, p > 0.05), and the moderating relationship remains 
insignificant for each of the sub-indices (Models 2–4). Moreover, a t-test comparison between the 
estimates of young firms and old firms (models 1 vs 5; models 2 vs 6; models 3 vs 7; models 4 vs 
8) indicates the estimates are statistically and significantly different (p < 0.001). Thus, we do not 
find support for Hypotheses 4.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
                                                 
cannot think of a theoretically-sound reason to explain why regulation might affect each of these age categories 
differently. Therefore, we only examine and contrast the young age category (0–1 years) and mature age category (≥ 
11 years) to be more consistent with theory and extant literature (Bailey & Thomas, 2017).  
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5. Robustness check 
 Table 5 tests the robustness of our main results by using an alternative measure of 
regulation. RegData provides this alternative measure, which reports the total word count for the 
regulations contained in the Code of Federal Regulations. The logic behind this alternative 
measure is that a lengthier administrative code naturally imposes more restrictions and limitations 
on firm activity. Consequently, larger word counts are indicative of more regulation. Model 1 
presents baseline results with only control variables. Model 2 augments this model to include 
economic freedom and the alternate measure of regulation. The results indicate that economic 
freedom is associated with more net jobs created (β = 31.11; p < 0.001), but regulation has no 
direct effect on net job creation in the non-interaction model. Model 3 adds an interaction term to 
test our hypothesis that economic freedom moderates the effect of regulation on net job creation. 
The results support our core Hypotheses: regulation is associated with lower net job creation (β = 
–43.51; p < 0.001), but this effect decreases as economic freedom increases (β = 5.52; p < 0.001). 
We decompose the economic freedom index into its three areas in Models 4 through 6 of Table 5. 
The results hold for the tax freedom and labor market freedom components but not for the freedom 
from government spending component. This is precisely the result we found in Table 3, which 
further validates our findings.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
6. Discussion 
 We were motivated by the prevailing view in the entrepreneurship literature that presents 
regulation as a homogenous barrier to entrepreneurial job creation (Bradford, 2004; Djankov et 
al., 2002; Escribá-Pérez & Murgui-García, 2017; Klapper et al., 2006). Despite the large support, 
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this view fails to account for the heterogeneous effects of regulatory institutions (Kim et al., 2016). 
Scholars have paid limited attention to the fact that regulatory costs are unequally dispersed, 
instead treating them as symmetrical across firms and regions. This approach is inconsistent with 
the stylized facts about entrepreneurship—some new ventures do emerge and grow even in highly 
regulated industries (Henrekson & Johansson, 2010). We argued that prior single-level and even 
multi-level studies cannot account for this because they overlook the multiple levels of government 
within which entrepreneurs are embedded. In many instances, entrepreneurs must navigate more 
than one formal institutional level and one informal institutional level; they must also operate 
within a formal institutional environment consisting of multiple political layers.  
Our work suggests that modeling these multiple political layers is important because the 
impacts on entrepreneurial outcomes are contingent on one another. Thus, to examine why the 
effects of national regulation on entrepreneurship vary across regions, we proposed a model of 
hierarchical institutional interdependence—the effects of national institutional regulation are 
contingent upon the regional institutional framework. Drawing on the theory of market-preserving 
federalism (Weingast, 1995), which suggests that regional policymakers possess more local 
knowledge about their particular economic context, we predicted that regional institutions would 
oppose and counteract federal rules that do not accord with regional enterprise needs, yielding 
heterogeneity in the effects of federal regulation across regions.  
Our analysis revealed that national regulation is negatively associated with entrepreneurial 
net job creation and that state economic freedom is positively associated with entrepreneurial net 
job creation. Critically, we uncovered a moderating effect where state economic freedom 
attenuates the adverse effect of regulation on entrepreneurial net job creation. The magnitude of 
this moderation is not trivial: a one percent increase in industry-level regulation was associated 
29 
 
with 14 fewer jobs created on net, but this effect varied considerably with the quality of the regional 
institutional environment. In states that have very little economic freedom, a one percent increase 
in industry-level regulation was associated with roughly 27 fewer net jobs created in a county. On 
the other hand, regulation had no discernable effect on net job creation in states that have very 
high levels of economic freedom. This finding is notable—the economic costs of decreased net 
job creation brought about by national regulation are completely mitigated in the most 
economically free regions. Our analysis also revealed that these offsetting results are driven by 
older firms and not by young firms. 
Our work speaks to the ongoing debate on the merits of a multilevel institutional 
framework such as the U.S. federalist system. Indeed, the “centralization versus decentralization” 
debate has a rich history, including the well-known arguments of Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay in The Federalist Papers. More recently, a concern raised in political 
science is that voters governed by multilevel or overlapping political entities may have a more 
difficult time attributing economic outcomes to particular government levels, thereby mitigating 
electoral accountability (Anderson, 2006). While voters’ ability to attribute responsibility for 
regional activity is beyond our scope, we nonetheless find that there are distinct and economically 
meaningful policy impacts for different institutional levels. Furthermore, we show that the regional 
institutional environment moderates the impact of national policy. To the extent that regional 
policy is more flexible and responsive to local economic conditions than national policy, the 
benefits to building the capacity of regional policymaking are greater than previously 
acknowledged. 
While the relationships we observe are robust, our analysis also reveals nuance in the role 
of regional economic freedom—specifically in relation to the three sub-indices. The positive direct 
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effect of regional economic freedom holds for the tax freedom and labor market freedom 
components. It does not hold, however, for the freedom from government spending component. In 
fact, the freedom government spending component has a negative direct relationship to net job 
creation. We also found that taxes and labor market freedom both moderated the effects of national 
regulation, but freedom from government spending did not. These results may be indicative of 
government spending’s ability to foster short-run employment growth: greater government 
spending reduces a state’s regional economic freedom score but may subsidize job creation. Of 
course, this does not imply that such subsidization is conducive to economic growth. Greater 
government spending will eventually impose costs, but they may be hidden or deferred through 
debt financing. We are unable to observe the long-term relationship between regional economic 
freedom (or its components) and net job creation, and while this is beyond the scope of our 
analysis, we believe it is worthy of future research. Our findings speak to the complexities of what 
makes a “good” institutional environment, and they affirm the value of addressing heterogeneity 
in the implications of various aspects of regional economic freedom (Dilli et al., 2018). 
6.1. Limitations and future research suggestions 
One critique of the institutional approach to regional economics is that regional institutions 
may be difficult to measure and hence to operationalize in analysis (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). While 
the improvement and creation of regional institutional measures is indeed an object worthy of 
additional study (Teague, 2016), our work suggests that extant indices can yield fruitful insights 
about regional institutional variation. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with recent work 
showing that regional institutions can incentivize labor mobility, particularly among high-skilled 
workers (Mulholland & Hernández-Julián, 2013; Nifo & Vecchione, 2014). Extending this 
linkage, future research could consider to what extent the relationships we observe vary along the 
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skill spectrum and how they relate to interregional migration. For instance, if federal regulations 
are less economically harmful to businesses in more economically free regions, does this further 
the incentive for firms to reallocate their activities to those regions? 
Perhaps our most surprising result is that the relationships we observe appear to be driven 
by the oldest firms. The economic theory of regulation conceives of regulation as asymmetrically 
burdening potential entrants, thereby favoring incumbents (Stigler, 1971). Indeed, our a priori 
expectation was that this would translate to further reduce net job creation by young firms 
specifically, and that economic freedom would empower young firms asymmetrically. But the 
results we found are interesting in light of recent work addressing regulation and job creation 
across firm size. While some researchers have found negative effects of regulation for small firms 
(Bailey & Thomas, 2017), others find an equivocal relationship (Goldschlag & Tabarrok, 2018). 
We depart from these studies by considering firm age rather than size, which is arguably a better 
categorization for job creation (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Future work might consider the effects 
of regulation while accounting for age and size concurrently; unfortunately, data constraints 
preclude this in the current exercise.  
It is plausible that young firms’ job turnover decisions are not primarily driven by 
regulation (Goldschlag & Tabarrok, 2018). It is also worth noting that net job creation for the 
median young firm is minimal (Decker et al., 2014). It is instead a small proportion of young firms 
that drive job creation; these “high-growth” young firms are not limited to a particular industry 
(Henrekson & Johansson, 2010). We do not directly test the impact of regulation on the incidence 
of high-growth entrepreneurship, instead looking at all young firms. Thus, for the typical 
observation in our young firm subsample, net job creation may simply be economically 
insignificant.  
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In contrast, state economic freedom does offset the negative effects of regulation among 
older firms—an important finding in light of the literature on regional employment growth (Acs 
& Armington, 2004; Digiovanna, 1996; Holm & Østergaard, 2015). Much of this work emphasizes 
the direct effects of regional policy in driving variation in net job creation. The evidence suggests 
that a variety of policy regimes may be conducive to net job creation in different contexts—e.g., 
those tailored either toward new ventures or incumbents (Audretsch & Fritsch, 2002). 
Interestingly, our findings position economic freedom as a vehicle for net job creation by 
incumbents.  
While our analysis makes important headway into consideration of the interaction of 
governance institutions for employment and entrepreneurship, it does have limitations worth 
noting. First, it is worth considering the possibility of reverse causality among net job creation and 
our key independent variables, regulation and economic freedom. This logic argues that new 
regulations such as employee health and safety or technology standards might arise in response to 
job creation. Upon further consideration, however, this seems less plausible: because regulations 
are more closely tied to the political process and rent seeking interests (Murphy et al., 1993), it is 
far from obvious as to why regulation would substantively change in response to net job gains.  
Second, measuring institutions is a complex endeavor (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Although 
we utilize the best available measures of federal and state level policies we consider, measurement 
error is a plausible issue. That said, similar studies using RegData do not find evidence of 
measurement error (Goldschlag & Tabarrok, 2018), which helps to alleviate this concern. 
Third, our research focuses on the net outcomes of firm growth activity at the industry 
level. We believe this is beneficial in order to observe the economic implications of the 
entrepreneurial competition we have described, and we retain as local a unit of analysis as available 
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data allow (i.e., the industry-county-year). However, research engaging the firm and individual 
levels that follows our hierarchical institutional interdependence framework has a great deal to 
offer. It is clear that the effects of regulation are also heterogeneous with respect to both firm 
characteristics (e.g., their resource base and capabilities) and entrepreneurs’ cognitive traits 
(Boudreaux, Nikolaev, & Klein, 2018; Estrin et al., 2013). Explicit modeling of the multilevel 
formal institutional environment represents a promising direction for scholars developing the 
micro-foundations of the institutions-entrepreneurship nexus. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In light of the global shift toward the entrepreneurial economy (Thurik, Stam, & Audretsch, 
2013), the accumulation of federal regulation becomes increasingly important. We explore how 
policies at different governance levels interact to influence regional enterprise. While regional 
policymakers may be unable to change national policy outcomes, their decisions can shape the 
impact of those policies on entrepreneurial job creation at the subnational level.  
Using insights from the theory of market preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995), we have 
modeled the institutional hierarchy to capture how entrepreneurs are embedded within multiple 
institutional levels of governance. When lower levels of governance deviate from national levels, 
local policy makers have the ability to counteract decisions to improve the local economy through 
policies that enhance employment and net job creation. This insight has been overlooked in 
previous discourse. 
 Our work offers four implications. First, because scholars tend to focus on direct effects of 
regional institutions on regional economic activity, the importance of such institutions has likely 
been understated. The finding that regional economic freedom moderates the effects of national 
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regulation suggests that researchers should consider both direct and indirect consequences of 
regional enterprise policy when formulating and testing models of the policy nexus. Second, our 
work implies that the impact of regulation on entrepreneurs is more nuanced than previously 
acknowledged. Not only have we identified regional heterogeneity in the effects of regulation, we 
also found surprising evidence that regulation’s costs were not moderated for young firms, at least 
on the job creation margin. Third, our work points to regional economic freedom as an fruitful 
object of inquiry for the entrepreneurial ecosystems literature, as it represents an important answer 
to calls for policy reform that would foster an entrepreneurial regional economy (Stam, 2015). 
Finally, by incorporating the theory of market-preserving federalism, we demonstrate the rich 
potential and ready availability of explicitly multilevel theoretical frameworks from other 
disciplines that can be incorporated into regional studies.  
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Table 1. 
 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Job creation 463,474 48.77 478 -27043 36651 
EFNA index 463,474 6.99 0.62 5.25 8.46 
Restrictions  463,474 60247 46040 4558 209220 
Median household income 463,474 42849 11180 16868 125900 
Unemployment rate (%) 463,474 0.065 0.027 0.01 0.24 
Population  463,474 89347 243504 40 5330484 
Poverty (%) 463,474 15.69 6.15 2.5 62 
Population density  463,474 175 733 0.005 26179 
Number of firms 463,474 209 1522 1 130454 
 
Table 2.  
Correlation Matrix 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Job creation [1] 1         
EFNA index [2] 0.007* 1        
Restrictions  [3] -0.023* 0.004* 1       
Median household income [4] 0.101* -0.01* 0.025* 1      
Unemployment rate [5] -0.029* -0.326* 0.022* -0.285* 1     
Population  [6] 0.339* -0.036* -0.007* 0.280* -0.002 1    
Poverty percent [7] -0.032* -0.002 0.027* -0.681* 0.492* -0.093* 1   
Population density  [8] 0.199* -0.06* -0.001 0.217* 0.014* 0.576* -0.06* 1  
Number of firms [9] 0.151* -0.02* -0.003 0.119* -0.008* 0.364* -0.042* 0.211* 1 
Note. * p<0.05.  
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Table 3.  
Effects on job creation 
 Dependent variable = job creation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Median household income (log)a -178.1*** -178.7*** -179.8*** -175.9*** -176.24*** -176.40*** 
 (21.75) (21.74) (21.71) (21.87) (21.89) (21.95) 
Unemployment (log) -85.54*** -77.95*** -78.21*** -78.42*** -78.42*** -78.76*** 
 (8.117) (7.706) (7.715) (7.69) (7.69) (7.70) 
Population (log)a 6.967 5.573 4.708 7.63 6.82 6.81 
 (11.94) (11.70) (11.62) (11.32) (11.23) (11.26) 
Poverty (log) 36.87*** 39.20*** 39.44*** 36.82*** 37.28*** 36.71*** 
 (9.132) (9.247) (9.254) (9.23) (9.24) (9.23) 
Population density (log)a 1.090 1.104 1.137 0.91 0.94 0.96 
 (3.530) (3.506) (3.503) (3.50) (3.50) (3.50) 
Number of establishments (log) 0.548 0.549 0.549 0.53 0.53 0.531 
 (0.578) (0.577) (0.577) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Regulations        
  Log of restrictions (R) a b  -14.12** -57.85*** -24.65** -54.16*** -72.91*** 
  (5.421) (11.95) (7.70) (10.43) (10.99) 
Economic freedom       
  EFNA index  31.12*** 30.79***    
  (9.342) (9.322)    
  EFNA government spending    -12.00*** -12.13*** -12.22*** 
    (3.78) (3.79) (3.80) 
  EFNA taxes    33.82*** 33.60*** 33.87*** 
    (8.01) (8.01) (8.01) 
  EFNA labor market freedom    33.07*** 33.11*** 33.56*** 
    (8.24) (8.24) (8.28) 
Moderating effects       
  EFNA index x R   6.236***    
   (1.856)    
  EFNA government spending x R    1.37   
    (1.07)   
  EFNA taxes x R     6.27***  
     (1.71)  
  EFNA labor market freedom x R      8.36*** 
      (1.64) 
Model fit statistics       
  Number of observations 463474 463474 463474 463474 463474 463474 
  Number of groups (counties) 2698 2698 2698 2698 2698 2698 
  AIC 6950678 6950647 6950624 6950573 6950543 6950534 
  Degrees of freedom 31 33 34 34 34 34 
  Prob > F *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  Log-likelihood -3475307 -3475289 -3475277 -3475250 -3475234 -3475230 
  County-level variance 191.6 194.6 195.4 193.5 194.2 194.1 
  Model residual variance 438.1 438.1 438.1 438.3 438.0 438.0 
  % of variance, rho 16.1 16.5 16.6 16.3 16.4 16.4 
  LR test of rho = 0 c  *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  LR test of model fit d --- --- *  * * 
       
Note. Dependent variable is annual number of jobs created. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the county-level 
and reported in parentheses. a denotes 1000s. b mean-centered. c Test of significance of county-level variance. d 
Likelihood ratio test that compares model 2 to models 3-6. Year and industry fixed effects included in all models.  
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.  
Effects on net job creation (results stratified by firm age) 
 
 Dependent variable = Net job creation  
 0–1 years   ≥ 11 years  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Median household income (log)a 2.593 (4.23) 3.264 (4.11) 3.247 (4.10) 3.242 (4.10)  -151.6*** (19.76) -148.7*** (19.93) -148.9*** (19.95) -148.9*** (20.00) 
Unemployment (log) -11.89*** (1.42) -12.11*** (1.46) -12.11*** (1.46) -12.10*** (1.46)  -51.87*** (5.63) -52.04*** (5.57) -52.03*** (5.57) -52.28*** (5.579) 
Population (log)a 9.244** (3.16) 9.110** (3.15) 9.172** (3.15) 9.121** (3.15)  -6.730 (9.50) -4.595 (9.06) -5.342 (9.05) -5.206 (9.085) 
Poverty (log) -2.029 (1.63) -2.135 (1.63) -2.165 (1.63) -2.126 (1.63)  36.93*** (7.88) 35.06*** (7.87) 35.52*** (7.88) 34.97*** (7.869) 
Population density (log)a -2.465 (1.42) -2.466 (1.42) -2.471 (1.42) -2.468 (1.42)  4.772 (3.06) 4.597 (3.05) 4.632 (3.04) 4.643 (3.044) 
Number of establishments (log) 0.110 (0.13) 0.109 (0.13) 0.109 (0.13) 0.109 (0.12)  0.170 (0.62) 0.153 (0.62) 0.158 (0.62) 0.152 (0.624) 
Regulations                  
 Log of Restrictions (R) a b -9.175 (4.722) -10.88** (3.410) -9.291* (3.984) -9.942* (4.024)  -48.68*** (9.295) -20.69** (6.38) -46.64*** (8.126) -55.79*** (9.276) 
Economic freedom                  
 EFNA index 4.123** (1.333)        25.64
** (7.814)       
 EFNA government spending   0.224 (0.729) 0.215 (0.727) 0.212 (0.726)    -6.990
* (3.056) -7.080* (3.060) -7.132* (3.068) 
 EFNA taxes   3.162
** (1.102) 3.215** (1.097) 3.161** (1.103)    25.08
*** (6.567) 24.84*** (6.567) 25.12*** (6.566) 
 EFNA labor market freedom   1.437 (1.479) 1.436 (1.477) 1.445 (1.472)    24.33
*** (6.950) 24.37*** (6.949) 24.68*** (6.989) 
Moderating effects                  
 EFNA index x R -0.449 (0.671)        5.632
*** (1.277)       
 EFNA gov’t spending x R   -0.182 (0.370)        1.503 (0.767)     
 EFNA taxes x R     -0.493 (0.640)        5.879
*** (1.172)   
 EFNA labor market freedom x R       -0.342 (0.544)        6.637
*** (1.222) 
Model fit statistics                  
Number of observations 341063  341063  341063  341063   447556  447556  447556  447556  
Number of groups (counties) 2698  2698  2698  2698   2698  2698  2698  2698  
AIC 4136467  4136468  4136466  4136468   6526453  65264267  6526389  6526392  
Degrees of freedom 34  36  36  36   34  36  36  36  
Prob > F ***  ***  ***  ***   ***  ***  ***  ***  
Log-likelihood -2068198  -2068197  -2068196  -2068197   -3263191  -3263176  -3263157  -3263159  
County-level variance 68.82  68.89  68.85  68.88   98.94  97.71  98.34  98.20  
Model residual variance 104.5  104.5  104.5  104.5   356.1  356.1  356.1  356.1  
% of variance, rho 0.303  0.303  0.303  0.303   0.0717  0.0700  0.0709  0.0707  
LR test of rho = 0 c ***  ***  ***  *** 
  ***  ***  ***  *** 
 
Note. Dependent variable is annual number of jobs created. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the county-level and reported in parentheses. A t-test comparison between the 
estimates of young firms and old firms indicates the estimates are statistically and significantly different (p<0.001). This test compares models 1 vs 5, models 2 vs 6, models 3 vs 7, 
and models 4 vs 8. a denotes 1000s. b mean-centered. c Test of significance of county-level variance. Year, county, and industry fixed effects included in all models.  
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.  
Effects on net job creation (alternative measure of regulation) 
 Dependent variable = Net job creation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Median household income (log) -178.1*** -178.8*** -179.9*** -175.84*** -176.35*** -176.72*** 
 (21.75) (21.74) (21.72) (21.86) (21.91) (21.97) 
Unemployment (log) -85.54*** -77.95*** -78.24*** -78.40*** -78.42*** -78.87*** 
 (8.117) (7.706) (7.720) (7.69) (7.69) (7.71) 
Population (log) 6.967 5.579 4.652 7.69 6.78 6.59 
 (11.94) (11.71) (11.60) (11.31) (11.21) (11.22) 
Poverty (log) 36.87*** 39.20*** 39.45*** 36.81*** 37.31*** 36.69*** 
 (9.132) (9.247) (9.249) (9.23) (9.24) (9.24) 
Population density (log) 1.09 1.100 1.137 0.91 0.94 0.98 
 (3.53) (3.506) (3.503) (3.50) (3.50) (3.50) 
Number of establishments (log) 0.548 0.549 0.548 0.53 0.53 0.531 
 (0.578) (0.577) (0.577) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Regulations       
  Log of words (W)  -4.584 -43.51*** -10.38 -39.29*** -65.79** 
  (3.471) (12.49) (7.67) (10.56) (10.95) 
Economic freedom       
  EFNA index  31.11*** 30.75***    
  (9.342) (9.313)    
  EFNA government spending    -11.98*** -12.15*** -12.30*** 
    (3.78) (3.79) (3.80) 
  EFNA taxes    33.82*** 33.59*** 33.85*** 
    (8.01) (8.00) (8.01) 
  EFNA labor market freedom    33.05*** 33.13*** 33.73*** 
    (8.23) (8.24) (8.28) 
Moderating effects       
  EFNA x W   5.519**    
   (1.931)    
  EFNA government spending x W    0.75   
    (1.11)   
  EFNA taxes x W     5.47*****  
     (1.80)  
  EFNA labor market freedom x W      8.61*** 
      (1.66) 
Model fit statistics       
  Number of observations 463474 463474 463474 463474 463474 463474 
  Number of groups (counties) 2698 2698 2698 2698 2698 2698 
  AIC 6950678 6950649 6950630 6950577 6950551 6950530 
  Degrees of freedom 31 33 34 34 34 34 
  Prob > F *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  Log-likelihood -3475307 -3475290 -3475280 -3475251 -3475239 -3475228 
  County-level variance 191.6 194.7 195.5 193.45 194.2 194.3 
  Model residual variance 438.1 438.1 438.1 438.0 438.0 438.0 
  % of variance, rho 16.1 16.5 16.6 16.3 16.4 16.4 
  LR test of rho=0 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  LR test of model fit --- --- *  * * 
Note. Dependent variable is annual number of jobs created. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the county-level and reported in 
parentheses. a denotes 1000s. b mean-centered. c Test of significance of county-level variance. d Likelihood ratio test that compares 
model 2 to models 3–6. Year and industry fixed effects included in all models.  
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1.  
Marginal Effect of Regulation on Net Job Creation with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
 
 
